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AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF MUNICIPAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN GENERAL ASSUMPSIT AND TORT
GEORGE K. GARDNER,* LESLIE M. GELLER,f JOHN F. McGRORY,t AND
WILLIAM B. SHAFFER, JR.-f

I. Introduction
This paper is written in the conviction that the world is governed
by natural law. It is our ambition to describe an analytical method
by which the true responsibility of a municipality in respect to any
given claim in general assumpsit or tort may be ascertained. It is not
pretended that the method which we shall offer will yield a result in
harmony with every reported judicial decision and statute, nor even
that it may not differ rather widely from the system of legal rules
prevailing currently in many states. It is our hope to present an
exposition of basic principles in harmony with the historic traditions
of the Anglo-American system and which will command the reader's
assent.
In order to forestall misunderstanding, it will be desirable to define
the sense in which the term "general assumpsit" is used. As used in
this paper, it is intended to exclude not only all demands based on an
express agreement, but also all demands based on any actual agreement or promise which is inferred from the conduct of the parties or
from the course of events. Its use will be confined to that class of cases
in which a defendant is alleged to be indebted for value received, not
in consequence of any agreement, but by operation of law. In short, it
is the intent of this paper to deal with the subject of municipal liability
to pay money arising otherwise than from a contract made by a
municipal officer in strict accordance with the authority conferred
upon him.
No person or organization can pay out money unless it has acquired money in some way. There are, in general, three methods of
acquiring money in this world. One is to ask for it; one is to earn it;
and one is to take it away from someone else.
The first method, that of asking for it, is one which municipalities
ordinarily do not pursue.
The second method, that of earning it, is not characteristic of municipalities, although it is pursued rather frequently- as when municipalities supply services or commodities such as water, light, power,
or sewerage service to such customers as choose to purchase at specified prices; or when they operate toll bridges or toll roads. This is the
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
t Class of 1955, Harvard Law School
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method of economic enterprise, the means by which the majority
of any population must necessarily acquire whatever money they have.
The third method, that of taking money from others, is that normally
pursued by all states and municipalities, and is called taxation when
pursued by them. It is distinguished from larceny solely on the ground
that the state or municipality employs the money thus collected to
sustain services and maintain conditions which are deemed indispensable to the continued life of the people, and therefore to the life of the
individuals of whom the people is composed. Because the exaction of
taxes can only be justified by reference to the real or alleged necessities
of the people, the authority which exacts the taxes- be it king or
assembly- invariably claims for itself the sole and final decision as
to what those necessities are. In other words, it declines to submit to
any outside authority the question when, how, and for what purposes
the tax money thus exacted shall be disbursed. This is called the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and -since that doctrine lies at the root
of our problem -to that doctrine we now turn.
II. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Although the state necessarily reserves to itself the disposition of the
money which it collects by taxation, one of the chief services which
people have always demanded from every government is that justice
shall at all times be maintained. It results that the sovereign authority
-be

it king or assembly-

has invariably found it necessary to

recognize and give some sort of hearing to petitions for relief against
itself.
Sir William Holdsworth has devoted forty-one pages of his great
"History"' to a discussion of "The KING- The Development of the
Legal Conception of the Prerogative -Remedies against the Crown."
It is, we find, abundantly evident that never since the Great Charter
of A.D. 1215 -

and presumably never before it - has the Crown long

maintained the position that justice was synonymous with the King's
will. On the contrary, it is apparent that at least as early as the reign
of Edward I (A.D. 1272-1307) the practice had become established that
if a petition addressed to the King by a subject seemed to ask for
nothing more than the petitioner might demand as of right from a
fellow-subject the King would refer it to the regular judges with the
endorsement - "Let Right be Done." 2 The King- in the Middle
Ages as now- was an enterpriser and a proprietor as well as the
executive head of the Government; and it resulted that the petitions
thus referred to the judges dealt characteristically with what were
1. 9 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 4-45 (1926).

2. Id. at 9-12.
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then regarded as property rights.3 But, as Holdsworth points out, it
is possible to regard many contracts as grants of rights incorporeal, 4
and many torts consist of nothing more than invasions of property,5
hence these references of the petitions of right to the judges involved,
in effect, an acceptance of the Crown's liability for what we should now
regard as contracts and torts. Throughout the whole of this early
period the King's position was primarily that of a great landlord, and
his revenues chiefly derived from rents. But, with the passage of time,
the Crown's revenues came increasingly to arise from taxes, and the
Great Rebellion, the Restoration, and the Revolution, of the seventeenth century established the proposition that taxes could be levied
only with the Commons' consent. This put the petitions of right in a
new setting -for,
obviously, an appeal for redress to be awarded out
of a Treasury which can be replenished only by Act of Parliament
is an appeal to the King sitting in his Courts of Justice to pay out
money which only the King sitting in his two Houses- of Parliainent
can raise and appropriate according to law. The dilemma which such
petitions present is well illustrated by the famous case of The BankerS6
in which the petitioning money-lenders sought to collect by legal
process an annuity which Charles II "of our special grace, certain
knowledge, and mere motion" had charged upon "the duty of excise

upon beer, ale, and other liquors" twenty-three years before. The
decision of the House of Lords in favor of the petitioners- rendered
in A.D. 1700 after ten years of disputation among the great' officers
of state and the judges- may well be regarded as marking the final
transfer of command over the economy from the land-owning to the
mercantile class.
The century and a half which followed A.D. 1700 was an era of

rising power on the part of popularly elected assemblies throughout
the Anglo-American world. In A.D. 1637 a bare majority of seven out
of twelve judges had overruled John Hampden's contention that he
could not be compelled to pay "ship money" otherwise than pursuant

to an Act of Parliament;7 and the popular discontent evoked by this
decision had contributed to the overthrow of Charles I. In A.D. 1765

the Stamp ,Act, passed by the King in Parliament to defray the expense
of the French and Indian wars, was resisted by the American colonists

on the ground that they could be taxed only with the consent of their
own colonial assemblies, and resisted so vigorously that the tax had to
3. Id. at 12-29.

4.
5.
6.
the

Id. at 17-18, 20-21.
Id. at 18-20.
The Case of the Bankers in the Court of Exchequer, and afterwards in
Exchequer-Chamber and Parliament, 14. How. St. Tr. 1-114. The case
is summarized briefly, and with great clarity in 9 HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. su 'ra
note 1, at 32-39.
7. Hampden's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 825-1316.
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be given up.8 In A.D. 1776 the Declaration of Independence alleged
as one of its grievances against George III that he had given "his Assent
to . . .Acts of pretended legislation .... For imposing taxes on us
without our consent."9 In A.D. 1787 the Constitution of the United
States of America directed that 0 "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States" and that 1
only "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect taxes .. .to
pay the Debts ... of the United States [and] . . .to borrow money
on the Credit of the United States. . . ." The Eleventh Amendment
to the same Constitution directed that "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United
States ... ." Such a political environment was not favorable to the
evolution of the idea of a judicial judgment collectible by legal process
out of the treasury of the sovereign assembly. Although Congressno doubt from the beginning-gave attention to claims for justice
addressed to it by individuals, and although similar attention has from
early dates been given by state legislatures and town meetings, it was
not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the evolution of
the law of judicial relief against the sovereign power was resumed. On
February 24, 1855, Congress passed the first general statute authorizing
the Court of Claims to entertain suits against the United States upon
contracts. 12 On July 3, 1860, Parliament enacted the Petitions of Right
Act, 13 thus codifying the law governing these proceedings, which had
remained in neglected disorder ever since feudal times.
It is not, perhaps, wholly an accident that these legislative waivers of
the right of the sovereign to be protected from law suits coincided with
the reappearance of feudal ideas in the law. Certain it is that the
second half of the nineteenth century saw a great revival of interest
in the doctrines of the land law of the Middle Ages and the age of the
Tudors, and a widespread use of these doctrines as a foundation for
organizing the economy of large scale enterprise which was growing
up. The Bar looked to the ideas of property, contract, and judicial
justice as the sources of law and of wisdom, and the art of government by legislation was relegated to an inferior place. The law of
torts and of agency was pressed into service for the purpose of defining the responsibility of the propertied to the unpropertied classes,
and the century from A.D. 1850 to A.D. 1950 saw an uninterrupted
evolution of doctrine along that line. But the State was not thought of
8. See 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 304 (14th ed. 1929).
9. See 7 ENCYCLOPEDA BRITANNICA 125 (14th ed. 1929).
10.
11.
12.
13.

U.
U.
10
23

S. CONST. Art. 1, §1.
S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8.
STAT. 612 (1855).
& 24 VIcT., c.34 (1860).
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as an enterpriser or a proprietor -hence there was no pressure for
the development of a law relative of torts and agency applicable to
the State. People were content with legislation which provided
judicial remedies for the protection of property from seizures by
government and the collection of government debts. If an officer of
the state did a wrong, or acted illegally, that, by definition, was an act
outside his authority - and therefore something for which he was solely responsible and with which the public treasury was in no way concerned.' 4 Although the facts of economic life and of legal administration have been out of harmony with this doctrine for some decades,
that is still the prevailing philosophy of the taught and codified law.
It is, however, abundantly evident that the prevailing notions of
sovereign immunity are in process of change. As early as June 13,
5
1939, the Legislature of New York enacted that: 1
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to
have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as
are applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or
corporations.
16
On August 2, 1946 Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which provides that: -

... the United States district court ...

shall have exclusive juris-

diction to hear, determine and render judgment on any claim against
the United States for money only ...

on account of personal injury or

death caused by negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or
death in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. 17
And by the "Crown Proceedings Act, 1947"'1 the King of Great Britain
in Parliament enacted that:'2-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Crown shall be subject
to all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person of
full age and capacity, it would be subject: (a) in respect to torts committed by its servants or agents;
(3) Where any functions are conferred or imposed upon an officer of
the Crown as such either by any rule of the common law or by statute,
14. This curious lag of public law in following the well-established doctrines
of private law with respect to the responsibility of a superior for the consequences of whatever is done by his subordinate in its interest is clearly
pointed out in 9 HOLDSWORT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 39-45.
15. Court of Claims Act; Laws of New York 1939, c. 860.
16. Act of August 2, 1946, c. 753 §§ 401-424; 60 STAT. 842-47 (1946).
17. Id. § 410.
18. 10 & 11 GEo. 6, c. 44 (1947).
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and that officer commits a tort while performing or purporting to perform those functions, the liabilities of the Crown in respect of the
tort shall be as they would have been if these functions had been conferred or imposed solely by virtue of instructions lawfully given by
the Crown.

In short, the economic functions of the modern state have become far
too pervasive and vital to permit it any longer to disclaim responsibility for the acts of the officials by whom these functions are carried
on. The representative legislature today - like the King in the middle
ages - is compelled by its position to assume the duties of a parens
patriae;and - again like the King in the middle ages- it is presented
with so many petitions for justice that it must, perforce, refer them
to professional judges to ascertain what their merits may be.
It is true, of course, that municipal corporations have never enjoyed
sovereign immunity in the sense that they could not be summoned
to answer in court. But they have enjoyed the other, and more
substantial, aspect of sovereign immunity which results from the fact
that their funds must be provided by taxes, and from the doctrine that
only the electors or their representatives can raise, or authorize the
disbursement of, tax funds. No municipal officer has any authority to
disburse tax money unless the instructions given him by the electors

or their representatives are strictly pursued; and from this it has been
supposed to follow that no act of a municipal officer outside the strict
limits of his instructions can have the effect of giving to anyone a
claim upon the taxpayers' money which a judge can recognize and
enforce. The conclusion is a plausible one- but it is not inevitable.
It can be argued that tax money- like money voluntarily invested
in business - ought rightly to be held responsible for the consequences
of the activities which it supports. The issue which The Bankers Casel0
illustrates is a perennial issue, and every era must solve that issue

afresh. We turn now to examination of that issue as it presents itself
in municipal administration today.
III. Enterprise,Money, and Things
The idea of the dignity of the individual is basic to our scheme of
economic, social, and political life. But the dignity of the individual
does not reside in his capacity for enjoyment, or in prolonging his
essentially transient existence for a few extra years. It resides in his
character as a free agent able to choose, to pursue, and fo give practical effect to, purposes; and his dignity rises in proportion as the purposes chosen, pursued, and given effect to, transcend the limitations of
his own life. From this it results that every human life is an enterprise
capable of either frustrating, helping, or merging with, the enterprises
19. Supranote 6.
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of others; and the arts of business'.and politids .are directed toward
minimizing the mutual frustrations -and enlarging the mutual helpfulness of the enterprises involved. The administration of justice perhaps the first of the peaceful functions of government- is itself a
collective enterprise and must be supported by drawing on the individual resources of the peopl e . As other collective enterprises such as roads, public services, and public schools- are undertaken,
the share of the people's total energies which are devoted to common
ends becomes larger and the share devoted to individual ends becomes
less.
One of the greatest tools which mankind has devised for adjusting
individual enterprise to common enterprise, and individual enterprises to one another, is money. Money is the instrument by *hich
freedom within society is maintained. In simple economies the money
function is normally performed by some one or more commodities in recent centuries by silver and gold. But, just as Albert Einstein
and his fellow-scientists have familiarized us with the notion" that
matter is primarily a reservoir of latent energy, so the bankers have
demonstrated that the money function, of commodities results from
their capacity to stimulate human activity, and that commercial value
is to be thought of as a fund of potential energy rather than a measure
of mass. He who has "money in the bank" enjoys that sense of conififdence which arises from the possession of an ample reserve of power.
The bank account is potential energy which turns into kinetic energy
as soon as it is spent in bringing to pass those activities on the part of
others which the holder of the bank account desires to produce. These
activities on the part of ethers tend, in turn, to bring things into being,
and to move these things about from place to place. Thus~the creditor's
purposes, energized by the creditor's money, come to be realized in the
visible world.
Legislatures, as everyone knows, are concerned with two types of
activity- that of laying down rules of conduct and that of public
finance. When a municipality taxes those who have money it transfers
money frbm the taxpayers to-itself. "When' it taxes those-wh& do not
have money it puts them under pressure to find it by selling either
their property or their services to those who have.. When it appropriates the money thus raised to specified purposes it starts a chain of
human activity as a result of which those purposes will ultimately be
achieved. State statutes and municipal ordinances may formulate the
common purpbses-of a community. Only the raising-and' appropriationh
of money can put those purposes into effect. If these simple facts are
held firmly before the attention it is believed that the true prfindiples
governing municipal liability in general assumpsit and tort will become clear.
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IV. Municipal Liability in General
Assumpsit 2o
In endeavoring to deal with a somewhat' complex problem it is well
to begin with the classic statements of our basic beliefs:
A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another
is required to make restitution to the other.21
In books of the Law, as in other books, and in common speech, "person,, is often used as meaning a human being, but the technical legal
meaning of a "person" is a subject of legal rights and duties. One who
has rights but not duties, or who has duties but no rights, is, I suppose,
a person.
...As I showed at the end of the first chapter, a legal duty does
not imply any exercise of will on the part of the one subject to the
duty, and, therefore, for the existence of a legal duty, the person
bound need not have a will; but in order that a legal right be exercised,
a will is necessary, and, therefore, so far as the exercise of legal rights
is concerned, a person must have a will.22
What do we mean, then, by saying that a person, as thus defined, has
been "enriched." The answer, it is submitted, is that by "enriched"
we mean that a larger stock of things, or a larger fund of potential
energy, has been placed at the disposal of that person's will. All
healthy human beings possess wills, and the wills of those who count
in law and politics are pretty vigorous; but when we attribute personality to organizations, as distinguished from individuals, the problem becomes more complex.
What is a corporation? In the first place, there must be a body of
human beings united for the purpose of forwarding certain of their
interests. Secondly, this body must have organs through which it acts;
it must be an organized body of man; neighbors turning out to hunt
down a robber do not form a corporation. The interests of an organized
body of man cannot be effectually forwarded unless these interests are
protected by the State; and to give this protection, legal rights must
be created, and the organization through which the body is to act must
be recognized by the State . . . A corporation is an organized

body of men to which the state has given powers to protect its interests,
and the wills which put these powers in motion are the wills of
certain men determined according to the organization of the corporation.23
Private business corporations- at least as such organizations were
conceived of when Gray composed the above-quoted passage-existed
for the purpose of accumulating wealth for their shareholders. The
20. The treatment of this subject is the special contribution of Mr. McGrory.
21. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
22. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27 (2d ed. 1927).
23. Id. at 50-51.
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shareholders subscribed a capital sum of money, a fund of potential
energy, which the managers were expected to administer in such a
manner that the money value of the fund would grow. As the fund grew
beyond the size which the managers would need for the continuing conduct of the business the managers were expected to distribute portions
of it from time to time as dividends to the shareholders. Private corporations, thus conceived of, presented all the characteristics of the classic
"teconomic man." They were enriched by the accumulation of things and
energy, in precisely the same manner as individuals, and any section of
the American Law Institute's Restatement of Restitutioncan be applied
to them as readily as to anyone else. But when we attempt to apply
the Restatement of Restitution to municipalities difficulties arise. It
is not as easy as in the case of a private business corporation to know
whether the municipality is "enriched." The reason is that the municipality possesses a double character. Like the business corporation, it
is an organized body of men. Like the business corporation, it must
possess property, and potential energy in the form of funds. Like the
business corporation it has a will. But, unlike the business corporation, its will is not to possess property or to accumulate potential
energy. Its will is rather to raise the kinetic energies of the whole
people, to modify the total environment within which these energies
may express themselves, and to provide free areas and free services
equally accessible to all. Whether or not, in any given case, these activities enrich the people may be a matter of dispute. What is clear
is that the enrichment, if it exists, is not of the sort which can be
identified, and measured, and made the subject of a suit in court.
There are three principal types of transactions out of which claims
of a quasi-contractual nature against a municipality may arise. These
are:
First:-Caseswhere a municipality has acquired property upon a
promise to pay for it, which payment cannot lawfully be made out of
municipal funds.
Second:--Cases where a municipality has borrowed money outside
its debt limit or for a purpose for which it is not authorized to incur
debt.
Third:-Cases where work has been done or services rendered
pursuant to a contract made by municipal officers without statutory
authority or without the formalities required by law.
These three situations we shall now take up in the order named.
First:-Caseswhere a municipality has acquired property
upon a promise to pay for it, which payment cannot lawfully
be made out of municipal funds.
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Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable
duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to return it, a constructive trust arises. 24
If this section from the Restatement of Restitution is applied to the
,situation under discussion, it seems clear that the municipality may be
required to return to the vendor in specie the property which it has
received. Such appears to be the well-settled law.2 But of course if the
property purchased is consumed so that it cannot be recovered the
26
seller is necessarily left without relief.
Second:-Cases where a municipality has borrowed money
outside its debt limit or for a purpose for which it is not
authorized to incur debt.
In this case -although
it is clear that no debt can arise which is
chargeable upon the taxpayers -it
seems clear that the municipality
receives the borrowed money upon a constructive trust for the
lender,2 7 which may be enforced in equity as far as the money can be
traced. Thus, if the money is used to discharge a pre-existing valid
debt of the municipality, the lender will be subrogated to the debt so
discharged. 28 If the money is used in building a schoolhouse, the
lender will have an equitable lien on the building.29 But if the money
is -spent in constructing a highway, 3° or a levee 3 ' the lender will necessarily be left without relief. The schoolhouse is corporate property
used in conducting a corporate enterprise, and is therefore to be
treated like any other property acquired by a corporation by the use
of third parties' funds. The highway and the levee are alterations imposed upon the natural landscape to facilitate the life of the people.
They are not anyone's property, and no lien upon them can arise.
24. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
*25. Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U.S. 348 (1882)* Municipal Security
Co. v. Baker County, 39 Ore. 396, 65 Pac. 369 (1901); Superior Mfg. Co. v.
School Dist. No. 63 Kiowa City, 28 Okla. 293, 114 Pac. 328 (1910); General
Elec. Co. v. Fort Deposit, 174 Ala. 179, 56 So. 802 (1911); American-LaFrance
&'Foamite Industries, Inc. v. Arlington County, 169 Va. 1, 192 S.E. 758 (1937).
26. Litchfield v. Ballon, 114 U.S. 190 (1885),
27. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, § 160 (1937).
28. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 162 (1937). "Where property of one person
is used in discharging an obligation owed by another or a lien upon the
property of another, under such circumstances that the other would be
unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former
is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee or lien-holder."
29. Calloway Bank v. Ellis, 215 Mo. App. 72, 238 S.W. 844 (1922); Nuveen
v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Gadsden City, 88 F.2d 175, cert. denied, 301

U.S. 691 (1937);

RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION

§ 161 (1937): "Where property

of one person can by a proceeding in equity be reached by another as security
for a claim on the ground that Qthe wise. the former would be unjustly enriched, an equitable lien arises!'
30. Hovey v. Commissioners of Wyandotte County, 56 Kan. 577, 44 Pac.
17 (1896).
31. Newport v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 270, 24 S.W. 427 (1893).
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Third:-Cases where work has been done or services rendered pursuantto a contract made by municipal.officers with-outstatutory authority or without the formalities required-by
law.
It not infrequently happens that material is 'delivered, labor idone,
or services rendered under what purports to b6 a municipal contract
but which is in fact executed by an unauthorized officer, or aftei
failure to advertise for competitive bids,"or otherwise in a manner
which does not conform to law. In such a case thdre can, of course,
be no successful suit on the contract, which does ndt bind the municipality, and the question arises whether the contractor is entitled
to any other relief. It seems clear, in accordance with the doctrines
which have just been illustrated, that the contractor may recover hi§
materials if he can identify them, and that if the materials or work
have gone into property which the municipality owns in its corporate
capacity the contractor should have an equitable lien thereon.' But if
the materials, the labor, or the services have gone into public works'
or have merely been consumed in public activity, there is no physical
object upon which a lien can be asserted, and the contractor must
necessarily go without compensation unless he can 'claim it from the
taxpayers or from some existing fund. The decisions on this situation
are not in harmony, and it is impossible to deduce any settled principlE
from the mere study and comparison of the reports. Nevertheless, we
submit that it is possible to demonstrate the true principles which
should control the subject, and this we shall now attempt to do.
An individual, as we have already stated, is enriched whenever his
stock of useful physical objects or his fund of money is increased.
The people - unlike an individual or a corporation - cannot be enriched in this manner; because money has no meaning except as it
expresses the relationships betiveen individuals and corporations; and
because the people, except as they are organized into corporations,
possess no common will which can be exerted upon things. But the
people, like an individual, may be enriched in another manner; that is,
by improving their health, their strength, or their intelligence, or by
creating an environment more favorable to their activities; and it is
for these purposes that many municipal enterprises are carried on.
It is the function of the taxing authorities to determine in what direction the collective expenditure of individual energies will tend most to
enrich the people; and the law, it is submitted, has no other means of
measuring the extent to which any activity has enriched the people
except by reference to the amount of public money which has been
appropriated to its support.
It seems clear, therefore, that no contractor can demand a reward
from a municipality for any addition which he has made to its public-

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
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resources except out of money

which has been lawfully appropriated to bring that addition to the
public resources to pass.2 But where money has been duly appropriated to pay for a specific project, the more numerous authorities, so
far as the authors have been able to discover them, hold that the contractor is entitled to fair compensation out of the appropriation, notwithstanding irregularities in the contract pursuant to which the
work was done.3 3 In view of the conflict of decision on this issue, we
venture to explore its merits in more detail..
Every appropriation of public money, it is submitted, creates a trust
of which the officers authorized to disburse the appropriation are the
trustees. Everyone familiar with financial processes will recognize that
appropriations differ in the degrees of discretion with which the disbursing officers are entrusted. In some cases the appropriation is
placed at the disbursing officer's disposal, with authority to expend it
as he deems expedient in effectuating his department's mission. In
others the appropriation is accompanied by a mandate to apply
it toward achieving a specified result. In the former case it may be
that the disbursing officer's decisions are properly to be regarded as
sub-appropriations which are legally ineffective unless the formalities prescribed for selecting public employees and public contractors
are pursued. In the latter it would seem that the municipality is enriched unjustly if it retains the money after the project for which it
34
was lawfully appropriated has been achieved.
32. May v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 595, 78 N.E. 912 (1906); Stratton v.
City of Detroit, 246 Mich. 139, 224 N.W. 649 (1929); Sleight v. Board of
Education, 10 N.J. Misc. 523, 159 Atl. 707 (1932); Adalian Bros. v. City of
Boston, 323 Mass. 629, 84 N.E.2d 35 (1949). The contrary interpretation of
the Indiana statutes by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Ohio Oil Co. v. Michigan City, 117 F.2d 391 (1941) does not
seem convincing.
33. Peterson v. City of Ionia, 152 Mich. 678, 116 N.W. 562 (1908); Nebraska
Bitulithic Co. v. City of Omaha, 84 Neb. 375, 121 N.W. 443 (1909); Konig v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 128 Md. 465, 97 Atl. 1837 (1916); Omaha
Road Equipment Co. v. Thurston County, 122 Neb. 35, 238 N.W. 919 (1931);
Smith v. Town of Vinton, 216 La. 9, 43 So.2d 18 (1949). Contra, Robert G.
Lassiter v. Taylor, 99 Fla. 819, 128 So. 14 (1930); Federal Paving Corp. v.
City of Wauwatosa, 231 Wis. 655, 286 N.W. 546 (1939); Probst v. Menasha, 245
Wis. 90, 13 N.W. 2d 504 (1944). The majority view is in harmony with the
American Law Institute's UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 8-202, which states
that the rule of negotiability of investment paper "applies to an issuer which
is a government, governmental subdivision or agency only if either there
has been substantial compliance with the legal requirements governing the
issue or the issuer has received substantial consideration for the issue as a
whole or for the particular security and a stated purpose of the issue is one
for which the issuer has power to borrow money."
34. The suggested distinction can be illustrated by reference to Illustration
2 under Section 62 of the Restatement of Restitution, which reads as follows:
"2. In State X a statute provides that no contract for work to be
done for a municipality where the contract price exceeds $10,000
shall be made unless it has been passed upon at a regular session of the
municipal council duly called. A contracts with the City of Y for dredging for the price of $50,000, the contract being approved only by the
municipal officers. Upon completion of the work, A is not entitled to
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The authors submit, in short, that a municipality is enriched either
(1) by an increment to its corporate property, (2) by an increment to
its corporate funds, or (3) by the accomplishment of any project to
achieve which a corporate appropriation has been made.

V. Torts
Our law, as we have said already, conceives of each individual life
as an enterprise which realizes itself in the material world by exerting
its will upon the disposition of energy and things. In the course of
this enterprise it competes for the control of things and energy with
other enterprises; it exchanges things and energies with them; and it
associates itself from time to time with other enterprises in the pursuit of common ends. The American Law Institute's Restatements of
Contracts and Restitution deal with exchanges between enterprises.
The Restatement of Torts deals with the rules by which the competition of enterprises is regulated under our law.
The Restatement of Torts is applicable impartially to all adult
individuals, whatever their official or private positions. The restraints
and obligations which it imposes fall into two broad classifications,
(1) restraints on the freedom of personal conduct, (2) obligations resulting from the control of land. Inasmuch as corporations are incapable of personal conduct, but do exert effective control of land as
organizations, the obligations arising from the control of land are applicable to them directly while the doctrine of respondeat superior
determines the extent of their liability for individual torts.
The present authors entertain a definite theory as to the premises
from which the principle of respondeat superior is derived. It is not,
in their view, derived from the idea that the superior is a participant
in his subordinate's misconduct, an idea which in most cases is contrary to the fact. It is not properly derived from the idea that the
superior is more wealthy than the subordinate. It is derived, in each
reasonable compensation from Y although he believed that the council
had approved the contract or although he did not know of the statute."
If this illustration assumes that neither the contract nor the specific dredging
project itself has been passed upon by the municipal council the present
authors would agree with the authors of the Restatement. But if it be assumed that the municipal council has appropriated $50,000 to carry out the
specific dredging project in question, but has not approved the terms of the
contract under which it was executed, then the present authors would
disagree with the authors of the Restatement, and would contend that A
is entitled to reasonable compensation out of the $50,000 appropriated to the
project by Y. Such a case would seem to be analogous to that presented by
mack-Rayburn Co. v. Town of Worthington, 262 Ky. 710, 91 S.W.2d 13
(1936), in which it was held that where money had been given a town for the
express purpose of improving a road outside its boundaries, the town could
bind itself by contract to pay the money to the company which had made
the improvement, although it could not lawfully have bound itself to make
a similar payment out of tax funds.
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case where it is applied, from one or both of two facts which inhere in
the conception of command and subordination, (1) the fact that the
superior has provided the subordinate with either the means or the
opportunity of committing the tort in litigation, (2) the fact that at the
time of the alleged tort the subordinate's attention was necessarily
and properly occupied in the pursuit of the enterprise in which his
superior was engaged. Every ship-captain, every engine-driver, every
operator of a motor-truck, every fireman, policeman, and ditch-digger
is by the nature of his employment set the task of achieving a defined
objective with the minimum expenditure of energy and of time. This
enterprise, which his employer has set for him, properly takes precedence in his mind over other enterprises, and therefore characterizes the whole course of conduct out of which any tort which he may
commit must arise. If his activities in his employment result in a
wrong to some competing enterprise, it is his employer's enterprise
which has wronged it, and therefore his employer's enterprise which
must pay.
The peculiar difficulty which has always arisen in applying the law
of torts to municipalities arises from the fact that the enterprises of
municipalities are both competitive and altruistic - that they seek at
the same time to accumulate things and energy from the activities
of individuals and to distribute things and energy freely among the
people at large. Municipal officers and employees will everywhere be
fou nd engaged in both these activities; and municipal land is held,
sometimes for corporate purposes, sometimes for general public use.
The distinction between the "governmental" and the "proprietary"
functions of a municipality, therefore,, corresponds with a fact which
must exist in any society which conceives of each individual life as an
enterprise distinct from that of all other lives. However difficult it
may be to define this distinction, however much it may have been
misunderstood or misapplied in past decisions, it is a distinction which
cannot be escaped. In the hope of contributing to the clarification of
this subject and developing what seem to us to be the true principles
upon which the issues involved ought today to be dealt with, we shall
pursue the following five lines of thought:(1) The history of the law of municipal tort liability in New Jersey.
(2) The law governing tort liability in admiralty of public vessels
as established by the Supreme Court of the United States.
(3) The New York law of municipal tort liability as developed
under a statute waiving sovereign immunity.
(4) A brief survey of the present state of the law of public tort
liability throughout the country.
-. (5) A brief survey of the application of the principles of insurance
and responsibility to the problem in hand.

1955 J

ASSUMPSIT AND rTORT

These five lines of thought will be found to converge upon a common
conclusion to which we hope to enlist the reader's assent.
iaw
ofmunicipdl tort liability in New Jersey. 35
(1) The history of the
3 6 decided in 1840, marks
The case of Freeholdersof Sussex v. Strader,
the first reported occasion in New Jersey in which it was urged that
a municipal corporation should be held to answer for its tort. Suit was
there brought to recover damages for injury to a team of horses resulting from the defective condition of the abutments of a county bridge.
Recovery was denied, the Supreme Court of New Jersey announcing
for the first time the broad rule that no civil action will lie on behalf
of an individual who has sustained special damage by reason of the
neglect of a municipal corporation to perform a public duty. This
doctrine has never been abandoned in New Jersey,3 7 and is - of
course- an intelligible and defensible rule of law.
In Condict v. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City38 the Court of Errors

and Appeals purported to apply this doctrine by holding that a municipality was not legally responsible for the death of an individual
caused by the carelessness of a municipal trash collector in dumping
the contents of his cart.
"The true principle on which a municipal corporation is exempted
from liability in such cases is that ... the corporation is engaged in the
performance of a public service in which it has no particular interest
and from which it derives no special benefit or advantage in its corporate capacity, but which it is bound to see performed in pursuance of
a duty imposed by law for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
the community, and that persons employed in the performance of such
duties, though employed by the corporation, act as public officers
39
charged with a public service."

Whatever may be the intrinsic merits of this proposition, it is
obviously a different one from that laid down in Freeholdersof Sussex
v. Strader. It is one thing to say that a municipality is not legally
liable for failure to complete successfully an enterprise projected for
the public welfare. It is quite another to say that it is not legally liable
if, in the course of pursuing a public enterprise, it inflicts damage on an
individual who happens to stand in the way.
The case of Mayor of Jersey City v. Kiernan" holds that, although
a municipality is not liable for a defect in the construction of a sewer
which results in a breach which spills sewage over the plaintiff's land,
35. The treatment of this subject is the special contribution of Mr. Geller.
36. 18 N.J.L. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1840).
37. The rule is reaffirmed in Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N.J.L. 416, 78
Atl. 196 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910).
38. 46 N.J.L. 157 (Ct. Err. & App. 1844).
39. Id. at 160.
40. 50 N.J.L. 246, 13 AtL 170 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
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it is liable if, after notice, it allows the breach and the spillage of
sewage to go on.
In Hart v. Chosen Freeholdersof the County of Union4 the defendant
municipality was held liable for personal injuries resulting from the
plaintiff's falling into a hole which the defendants had dug in a highway. The court said: "We have not been pointed to any precedent extending exemption
from liability to cases of active wrongdoing nor are such precedents
to be discovered." 42
Why Condict v. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City might not have
been cited as such a precedent is not altogether clear.
In Karpenski v. Borough of South River 43 an electric light wire
maintained by the municipality for the purpose of public and private
lighting was negligently allowed to hang close to the ground while
charged with a deadly current. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries
from coming in contact with this wire. It appeared that the defendant
charged private consumers for electricity, though whether or not
this paid the full cost of the service does not appear.
"This brings us to a consideration of the demurrer which is principally directed to the fact that the, acts of the borough which are
alleged to have been negligently performed are acts of a public and
governmental nature for which no action can be maintained ....
The
operation of an electric lighting plant for the furnishing of light to
private consumers for gain cannot, in any sense, be the performance of
a governmental function."44
The demurrer was accordingly overruled. So far as can be ascertained from the report, the action was of such a character that a
judgment for the plaintiff would have become a charge upon the
general credit of the borough, and would not have been collectible
out of the revenues of the electric light department alone.
In Olesiewicz v. City of Camden45 the municipality was held legally
responsible for the negligent operation of its steam roller, while
employed in street construction, partly on account of the municipality
and partly on account of others without regard to whether a profit
for the taxpayers was derived.
"The fact is undisputed that the appellant embarked upon a private
enterprise, presumably for profit, or, if not, at least for the sake of
economy, in having the work done cheaper and better, than by letting
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

57 N.J.L. 90, 29 Atl. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
Id. at 93, 29 Atl. at 491.
83 N.J.L. 149, 83 Atl. 639 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
Id. at 151, 83 Atl. at 641.
100 N.J.L. 336, 126 Atl. 317 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929).
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it out on contract to a successful lowest competitive bidder as required
by statute. It is not essential that the municipality carried on the
enterprise for profit in order to hold it amenable for the acts of its

servants engaged to do the work, it is sufficient if it derives some
special benefit or advantage." 46

And in Morgenweck v. City of Egg Harbor47 the municipality was
held responsible for the negligent operation of a truck in the service
of its sewer department where a charge was made for sewer service
without regard to whether or not the charge covered the cost of
the sewer service.
"In view of the circumstances disclosed by the testimony in this
case, it is quite clear that the defendant appellant was engaged in the
business of operating a sewerage plant for profit, and it is unimportant whether or not the business yielded a profit to the defendant
appellant." 48
Finally, in Vickers v. City of Camden49 it was held that the fact
that the traffic lights at an intersection were showing green in both
directions did not make the municipality liable for the resulting
automobile collision, absent a showing that the municipal officers
were aware of the defect in the lights.
The law of New Jersey, which we have thus sketched very briefly,
may be regarded as typical of that prevailing in most of the United
States. It raises legal issues which need to be thought through
afresh. The first of these issues relates to the responsibility of the
municipality for damage to individuals resulting from the failure to
maintain a safe and wholesome environment within which individuals
may pursue the personal enterprises of their daily lives. The second
relates to the responsibility of the municipality for damage to individuals resulting from municipal enterprise pursued at the expense
of the taxpayers for the public good.
New Jersey has never departed from the doctrine of Freeholders
of Sussex v. Strader50 which held that the funds of a municipality
will not be answerable for damage to an individual resulting from
the failure of the municipality to provide adequately for the public
safety and convenience. This doctrine seems to the present authors
to be sound. To hold otherwise is to make the whole people responsible for the safety of each individual,-a doctrine which in the
past has been characteristic only of the law of ships and armies,
societies in which the individual life is merged in the collective
46. Id. at 340, 126 Atl. at 319.
47. 106 N.J.L. 141, 147 Atl. 468 (Ct. Err. &App. 1929).
48. !d. at 143, 147 Ati. at 469.
49. 122 N.J.L. 14, 3 A.2d 613 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939).

50. 18 N.J.L. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1840).
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enterprise and everyone is expected to act only in response to
command.
With respect to harm resulting from activities which the municipality sets in motion, the law of New Jersey is that the funds of
the municipality will be answerable except where the harm occurs
(1) without the knowledge of the responsible municipal officers, and
(2) results from an activity pursued exclusively for public benefit
without adding anything to the municipality's corporate property
or corporate funds. It is submitted, with deference, that this exception, tlhough long established, is without merit; and that it results from the misconception that enterprise, and the effort to earn
or conserve money, are synonymous terms. Surely the rights of a
citizen who has had trash dumped upon him by a servant of the
people of Jersey City, engaged in keeping their city as clean as they
think it should be, do not depend on whether the servant's wages
are paid by an ad valorem levy on real property or by a service charge
to each householder per barrel of trash. Surely the rights of a man
who has been led to a hospital bed by a light set up in the effort
to provide everybody with a system of public speedways do not depend on whether the speedway and the light are paid for by a
toll, by a tax on gasoline, by a tax on motor-cars, or by a tax on
real property. The doctrine of Condict v. Mayor & Aldermen of
Jersey City and Vickers v. Camden amounts to saying that enterprise
pursued for public-as distinct from corporate-benefit carries with
it no public responsibility for private wrong. To say this is to
repudiate the basic presupposition of the American legal system:
"The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals:
it is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each
citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be
governed by certain laws for the common good."'5'
(2) The law governing tort liability in admiralty of public
vessels as established "by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
It may not be uninstructive to refer at this point to the analogy
afforded by the American maritime law.
For centuries it has been the well settled doctrine that a ship
involved in collision as a result of bad navigation is liable in rem
for damage to the other vessel, her cargo and passengers, and that
this liability attaches to the vessel itself as an actor regardless of
whether those responsible for her navigation are the owner's agents
or not.52 If those in charge of the navigation are in fact agents of
51. Preamble to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
52. Harmoney v. United States, 2 How. 210 (U.S. 1844); The China, 7 Wall.
53 (U.S. 1868).
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the owner, personal liability attaches to the owner as well. In accordance with these principles the Supreme Court of the United
States decided, as long ago as 1900, that the City of New York was
legally responsible for damages caused by the collision of its fireboat with another vessel in New York Harbor notwithstanding that
the fire-boat was on its way to help fight a fire at the moment of the
collision and that, under the state law as it then stood in New York,
this was a "governmental activity" supported wholly out of taxation,
for which the city incurred no legal liability of any kind.5 3
On March 3, 1925, Congress enacted that "A libel in personam in
admiralty may be brought against the United States... for damages
caused by a public vessel of the United States."" On July 7, 1942,
the Cavalier, a Canadian vessel, while en route from Canada to
Jamaica, was ordered by the United States Naval authorities to
enter Delaware Bay. Upon approaching the Bay, the Cavalier received further instructions from the naval authorities that in her
transit of the waters constituting the entrance to the Bay, the Cavalier
was to follow directly astern of the patrol boat YP 249, a public
vessel of the United States. While following directly astern of the
YP 249, as ordered, the Cavalier struck a submerged wreck and
sustained serious damage. The Supreme Court held the United States
liable5 5 "It needs no extended citation of authority to show that
where a tug negligently grounds its tow, the tug and its owner are
liable for the damage resulting therefrom. . . . The fact that the
Cavalier was not fastened to the YP 249 by a tow rope is irrelevant...
for all practical purposes she was as firmly fastened to the stern of
the YP 249 as if she had been in tow."56
It is not easy to quarrel with the Supreme Court's conclusion that
the Cavalier was in tow. But the towage, if it was such, was not for
the convenience of the Cavalier. The towage was for the convenience
of the United States. The United States was exercising sovereignty's
highest prerogative, that of command. If it.is not beneath the dignity
of the United States of America to accept responsibility for the consequences of an error of its ship of. war, committed under such circumstances, surely it cannot be beneath the dignity of a municipality
to accept responsibility for the errors of its policemen, or even of its
trash collectors and traffic lights.
(3) The New York law of municipal tort liability as developed under a statute waiving sovereign immunity.V
53. Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
54. Act of March 3, 1925, c. 428, § 1, 43 STAT. 1112, 46 U.S.C.A. § 781 (1944).
55. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945).
56. Id. at 228-29.
57. The remainder of the discussion of torts is the special contribution of
Mr. Shaffer.
- I ... . .. 1 1 .I
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In 1939-climaxing a long evolution of legal doctrine58-the
of New York enacted the following statute:-

State

"The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action
and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to
actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article." 5 9
In 1945, in a suit against New York City the New York Court of
Appeals ruled as follows:"None of the civil divisions of the State-its counties, cities, towns
and villages-has any independent sovereignty. . . . The legal irresponsibility heretofore enjoyed by these governmental units was
nothing more than an extension of the exemption from liability
which the State possessed.... On the waiver by the State of its own
sovereign dispensation, that extension was naturally at an end and
thus we were brought all the way round to a point where the civil
divisions of the State are answerable equally with individuals and
private corporations for wrongs of officers and employees,-even if
no separate statute sanctions that enlarged liability in a given instance."60
It accordingly held the city liable to compensate the plaintiff for
personal injuries caused by a runaway police horse.
In New York, therefore, both the state and its municipalities are
civilly liable in tort in like manner as are private corporations and
individuals. But, since the state and its municipalities do not bear the
same relationship to citizens as do private corporations and individuals, this doctrine still leaves undecided precisely what the
extent of the substantive responsibility of the state and its municipalities may be. One proposition seems established-both the state and
its municipalities are-responsible for damage done to individuals as
a result of prosecuting their enterprises, whether "governmental" or
not. Thus they are liable for damage done by a runaway police horses'
for damage done by a false traffic signal, 62 and for damage done
58. For a review of the earlier history see Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability
in New York, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 278 (1948).
59. Court of Claims Act, Laws of New York, 1939, c. 860, § 8.
60. Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 604, 605
(1945).
61. Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
62. Foley v. New York, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945). This decision is
in harmony with Canadian Aviator Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215
(1945), note 55, supra, and is in striking contrast with Vickers v. Camden,
122 N.J.L. 14, 3 A.2d 613 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939), note 49 supra. Quite apart
from statute or controlling precedent, it is submitted that the result in
Foley v. New York is clearly correct. A traffic light is intended to be a
mechanical giver of commands and permissions. If such commands and permissions are negligently given, liability should be imposed for the consequences. Probably New York would impose liability, even where the traffic
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a policeman who is kept -armed by the municipal officers- even
when he employs the weapon in an unprovoked insane assault.63
The question which the New York decisions leave not wholly
settled is how far the state and its municipalities are liable for the
consequences of failure to make a success of free public services
provided at the taxpayers' expense. On the one hand, the Court of
Appeals has decided that a city charter providing that the city
"shall maintain" a fire department does not make the city liable
for failing to put out a particular fire.6 On the other, the same court
has twice held the state responsible for failure to post signs adequate to warn motorists of curves and intersections calling for reduced speed and a cautious approach. 65 The absence of such signs-not
the curves and intersections-was apparently treated as a physical
defect in the highway, for which also the state is held liable, 66 although it is not apparent that an "individual or corporation" would
be liable for defects in a roadway across his property over which
the public had a legal right to pass without toll. Perhaps the business
of offering public speedways for gasoline locomotives is regarded in
New York as an enterprise which, once undertaken, must be pursued to successful completion, just as a municipality is there held
liable if its police, after taking an ill and helpless man into custody,
67
neglect to provide him with necessary medical care.
(4) A brief survey of the present state of the law of public tort
liability throughout the country.
No one desiring to become thoroughly familiar with the subject
which we are discussing should omit to study the Symposium on
Governmental Tort Liability published by the New York University
Law Review in November 1954.68 He will learn that public liability
for damage done to private persons by official action has long been
an integral principle of the French legal system; 69 that the British
Parliament enacted the same principle in 1947;70 that the government
of the United States has adopted it in large measure, though not
light failed to give any signal (see cases cited note 65, infra). But it is submitted that the failure of a traffic light to give any signal should not impose
liability to persons to whom, in effect, no command or permission is given.
63. McCrink v. New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947).
64. Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
65. Eastman v. State, 303 N.Y. 691, 103 N.E.2d 56 (1951); Canepa v. State,
306 N.Y. 272, 117 N.E.2d 550 (1953).
66. Doulin v. State, 277 N.Y. 558, 13 N.E.2d 472 (1938).
67. Dunham v. Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952).
68. 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1321-1461 (1954).
69. Schwarz, Public Tort Liability in France, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1432 (1954).
See also Jacoby, Federal Tort Claims and French Law of Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, 7 VAND. L. REV. 246 (1954).
70. Wade, Liability in Tort of the Central Government of the United Kingdom, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1416 (1954).
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yet completely; 71 and will find a brief summary of the present state
of the law in each of the forty-eight states.72 The essay last cited
makes it apparent that the state of the law in New Jersey 73 is a fair
average sample of the law prevailing in all the states outside New
York. The following passage from that essay deserves quotation both
because it sums up the present state of affairs very clearly and because it provides a starting point from which to look ahead:"It is notable that the traditional common-law distinction applicable to municipal corporations, under which there is no liability
for harms committed in the course of performing "governmental"
(sometimes called "public") functions, whereas liability is imposed
for similar harms arising in performance by the municipality of
"proprietary" (sometimes called "private," "corporate," or "ministerial") functions, has not in general been applied in tort suits
against the states. States are usually deemed immune regardless
of what kind of functions they are performing. Why this is so of
the state, and not of -its municipal subdivisions such as townships,
counties, school districts, improvement districts, highway departments, universities, and the like, makes for interesting but baffling
speculation. What justifies differences in the rule as between different
agencies of government, all acting for the state, and why the
dividing line is put at one place in one state and at another elsewhere,
to be questions answered more by raccident than
seem sometimes
74
by reason."

Speculation as to why the states are altogether immune from tort
actions, while the municipalities are immune in only some cases,
may be interesting-especially in New York City-but will hardly
be baffling to those who have even a superficial acquaintance with
the history of Anglo-American law. The Declaration of Independence
wound up by asserting that "these, United Colonies are, and of
Right ought to be, Free and Independent States" and the law has
ever since proceeded on the assumption that each state was a
sovereign, and heir to all the privileges and immunities of the British
Crown. Municipalities, on the other hand, have never been thought
.of as sovereigns. The original New England towns were not even
corporations, but were merely partnerships in the maintenance of
a few limited services, and wherever municipalities have been incorporated they inherited the traditional British position of a corporation, which was that of associates in a common enterprise who
had been granted the legal privilege of confronting the sovereign and
their fellow-subjects as a single organic person 75 pursuant to the
71. Gellhorn and Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Dam-

age, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1325 (1954).
- 72. Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1363 (1954).
- 73. Ibid.

74. Id. at 1366.
75. See GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1927).
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"special grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion" of the Crown. 76
Such organizations were naturally thought of as capable of suing
and being sued like other persons, and the idea that municipal
corporations enjoy legal immunity not accorded to others is a fairly
new one in legal history, as has been pointed out. 77 That idea doubtless took its origin in the fact that municipal corporations were found
in practice to be exercising the sovereign prerogatives of levying
taxes and of making laws. To the extent that they continued to
present the appearance of collective enterprises their legal responsibility continued. The legal immunity of the states continues because
they have not characteristically engaged in business. With possible
exceptions, unknown to the present authors, no American state has
ever played the part of an enterpriser in economic production. The
most that the states have done has been to organize, to invest in,
and sometimes to guarantee the credit of, stock corporations and
their modern successors, the "authorities." So far as we are aware,
the tort liability of stock corporations was never questioned, nor is
the tort liability of "authorities" questioned today.
Nor are the reasons for the present state of the law obscure. The
Federal Government has waived its sovereign immunity because,
having become a vast business enterprise which impinges everywhere
in the economic life of all the people, it finds itself confronted with
a multitude of demands for justice to which Congress and the
Executive cannot attend. These are the same reasons which have
brought to pass the waiver of sovereign immunity by the British
Crown. The states, with few exceptions, have not waived immunity,
because they do not present themselves as engaged in enterprise.
The municipalities, in most cases, cling to their "governmental" immunities because they are small. It is frightening to the householders
of a small community to consider what the taxes to pay for the
consequences of one serious automobile collision might be.
(5) A brief survey of the application of the principles of insurance and responsibility to the problem in hand.
If it be true, as we have contended, that a municipality which
supports enterprises likely to cause harm to others ought to be
responsible for harm caused by such enterprises, whether "proprietary" or "governmental;" and if it be true that such a rule would
expose the taxpayers of small municipalities' to risks which they
ought not to be asked to carry, it is suggested that the true solution
76. See original charter of Dartmouth College, quoted in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 524 (U.S. 1819).
77. Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 278,
279 (1948), citing Steele v. Company of Western Navigation, 2 Johns. 283
(N.Y. 1807); People v. Albany, 11 Wend. 539 (N.Y. 1834); Martin v. Mayor of

Brooklyn, 1 Hill 545 (N.Y. 1841).
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of the dilemma lies in holding the municipality responsible for private
harm caused by its activities and permitting it to purchase insurance
against this liability precisely as private enterprisers now do. The
dilemma is not different from that which confronted small business
and manufacturing enterprises around the turn of the century, and
the business partners and small corporations of that era solved it in
the same way. Then, as now, the employee of the enterprise was
legally liable for the harm done by his activities, but there was a tacit
agreement that he could not, and ought not to be asked to, carry
the burden of this risk alone. Then, as now, it was thought that the
risk should be born by the enterprise, but the risk was large enough
to threaten even the enterprise with disaster unless the enterprise
was very large. Then it became customary for business enterprises
to protect themselves and their employees by insurance against tort
liability just as municipalities might do today. All that is needed today to set the same chain of cause and effect in motion is to apply
the doctrine of respondeat superior to all municipal enterprise, however financed.
The injustice and, indeed, irrationality of the present practice is concealed by the fact that it is not customary to bring actions of tort
for negligence against public employees, so that the suggestion that
actions might lie against the employing municipalities seems dangerous and strange. Yet the law is clear that individual public employees
are liable in tort for damage caused by their negligence, 8 and they
are, in most cases, much more exposed to ruin by a substantial tort
judgment than are the municipalities which they serve. The idea that
there is any fixed principle of law that judgments in tort can never
be charged against taxpayers simply does not correspond with the fact.
That there is no such principle in New Jersey, where municipalities
are not liable for torts in the course of "governmental" activity we
have already shown.79 In the City of Boston, where this is written,
the Metropolitan Transit Authority, and the Boston Elevated Street
Railway Company, its predecessor, have been paying tort claims for
the last three decades-yet for nearly the whole of that period the
enterprise has been run at a deficit which has been made up by the
taxpayers of the fourteen municipalities which the system serves.
It is very evident that the idea of dealing with this problem by
means of liability insurance is gaining ground.
"Many statutes authorize the state or designated agencies or subordinate units to pay for liability insurance with public funds, with
78. For illustrations see Askay v. Maloney, 92 Ore. 566, 179 Pac. 899 (1919);
Florio v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 101 N.J.L. 535, 129 Atl. 470
(1925). Note that the latter decision is from New Jersey where the municipality itself is not liable in such a case.
79. Supra p. 767.
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the double admonition that the state does not thereby waive its tort
immunity and the insurer must contract not to plead the immunity
as a defence to liability on the policy. Others provide that the state
or its subdivision waives its immunity but only to the extent of the
insurance coverage. Some enactments apparently require state employees to carry and pay for their own liability insurance, as when
they are hired to drive publicly owned vehicles, the cost of premiums
being presumably made up to them by slightly increased salaries.
Nearly all the states today require that school bus operations be covered by liability insurance, and the same requirement for other publicly owned motor vehicles is becoming increasingly common." 80
It is to be regretted that this movement does not seem to be taking
advantage of an insurance principle which has been well known for
centuries to professionals, but which is not as familiar to the general public as it ought to be.
People who insure their automobiles against collision are familiar
with the "deductible"-the clause which requires the insured to
carry the first $50 or $100 of loss. The principle is an old one and,
in other forms, has been practiced upon for centuries in marine insurance. It is well known in all fields of insurance that the bulk of
the claims, and the bulk of the expense for claims adjustment, arise
in connection with partial losses, and that care on the part of the
insured is greatly stimulated if he bears the first part of any loss.
Furthermore, from the standpoint of the person insured, his need is
not to be protected against the small misfortunes which attend every
normal activity. His need is to be protected against the disasters
which would permanently alter his way of life. In accordance with
these thoughts it is here suggested that it would conduce to responsibility on the part of public employees, and realism on the part of
juries in reaching verdicts, if statutes and insurance contracts were so
adjusted as to produce these results: -(1)
Each municipal employee
first
$50
or $100 of any tort claim
would be held responsible for the
The
municipality
employing him
resulting from his activities; (2)
would accept full responsibility for all tort claims beyond this; (3)
80. Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1365, 1413 (1954). It is undoubtedly true that many states today require
that school bus operations be covered by liability insurance; but Mr. Shaffer
is inclined to question the statement that this is true of "nearly all." Furthermore, there is great variation in the scope of the insurance required. Some
states require insurance only against the claims of passengers. Others require it against all claims resulting from the operation of the bus. The following are some of the school bus statutes: ARiz. CODE ANl. § 54-434 (Supp. 1951);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 234.03 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-429 (1952); GA. CODE
ANN. § 32-431 (1952); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 122.29-11a (Supp. 1954); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 17:159 (West 1951); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6336-19 (Supp. 1954);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-489 (Supp. 1953); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 18:14-12 (Supp.
1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-45.1 (Supp. 1953) ; OHio REV. CODE SERV. ANN.
§ 3327.09 (Baldwin 1954); S.C. CODE § 21-840.1 (Supp. 1954); VT. REV. STAT.
§ 10,172 (1947); VA. CODE § 22-284 (1950); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 67-647
(Supp..1953).
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The municipality would insure itself against the contingency that the
total of all the tort claims which it might have to pay in any year
would exceed a fixed maximum-say a sum equivalent to one dollar
per thousand in the tax rate on real estate. The authors are informed
that many large business enterprises insure themselves in this manner
and that the total cost of their tort and workmen's compensation
liabilities is thereby much reduced.
This closes our discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior.
It remains to add a word with regard to municipal liability resulting
from the control of land. We believe it is generally recognized that
the municipality carries the same responsibility as any other landowner for private nuisances occurring on the land which it controls. 81
With respect to land owned by the municipality in its corporate
character and employed in the conduct of public enterprise, however financed, no reason is perceived why its liability to tresspassers,
to licensees, and to persons visiting on business should be other than
that defined in the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts.82
With respect to land held in trust for the free use of the publicprincipally highways and parks-the situation of the municipality
is unique. There is no real analogy to be found in private law. If
such areas were left unimproved-merely open to public travel and
relaxation-no basis for municipal liability in respect to them would
appear. The complications of the problem arise from the fact that
such areas are customarily made into fields of public enterprisesuch as the construction of facilities for high-speed travel or particular
forms of entertainment. When this occurs the extent of municipal liability is not infrequently defined by statute. In the absence of
statute the choice would seem to lie between the still prevalent conception-as illustrated by New Jersey,-that there is no liability
to individuals for failure to achieve complete success in the prosecution of a public enterprise, and the contrary view which appears to
83
be winning acceptance in New York.
81. Jeakins v. City of El Dorado, 143 Kan. 206, 53 P.2d 798 (1936).
82. RESTATEmENT, TORTS §§ 343, 344 (1934). For illustrations of the application of the principle of the first of these sections to municipalities see Bell
v. City of Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 185, 146 Ati. 567 (1929); Flesch v. City of
Lancaster, 264 Wis. 234, 58 N.W.2d 710 (1953).
83. Cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 342, 345 (1934). These sections deal with
the liability of "a possessor of land" to gratuitous licensees and to persons
entering as of right. It may be doubted whether a municipality is the "possessor" of public highways and parks. Nevertheless, it may be thought that
the doctrine of these sections is applicable in principle to municipal liability
in regard to them. In the following cases municipalities were held liable as
"proprietors" with respect to parks: City of Waco v. Branch, 117 Tex. 394, 5
S.W. 2d 498 (1928); City of Sapulpa v. Young, 147 Okla. 179, 296 Pac. 418
(1931).
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VI. Conclusion

To sum up:The contribution which we have endeavored to make to this discussion may be stated thus:- The law of the past has concentrated
too much on the accumulation of things, and of potential energy in
the form of credits, as the end of economic life. Such accumulation
is indeed a necessary step in the process of purposeful existence, but
it is not the end. These accumulations are caught up and stored out
of the total stream of life and energy so that they may be channelled
toward their possessor's purpose-but to achieve that purpose they
must be released back into the stream.
A municipality is therefore enriched, not only when its property
and funds are added to, but whenever a purpose has been accomplished
to achieve which it has appropriated funds.
Every municipal activity is an enterprise, whether directed toward
accumulating things and energy or distributing energy and things to
the whole people. In their competitive relations with private enterprises all municipal enterprises, of whatever character, are properly
subject to the general principles of the law of torts.
When a municipal enterprise intended to distribute some benefit
freely to all the people fails to provide that benefit in a particular
instance, the question whether the individual who is disappointed
has a legal grievance can be answered only by resort to interpretation
of statutory law.
The risk of tort liability being a normal incident of all activity, insurance against that risk should be regarded as a normal incident
of municipal activity of every kind.

